martedì 17 marzo 2026

Revocation of the EU Long-Term Residence Permit Between Public Security Assessment and the Obligation to Grant an Alternative Residence Status: Commentary on TAR Emilia-Romagna, First Section, 26 February 2026, No. 334

 Revocation of the EU Long-Term Residence Permit Between Public Security Assessment and the Obligation to Grant an Alternative Residence Status: Commentary on TAR Emilia-Romagna, First Section, 26 February 2026, No. 334

The judgment delivered by the Regional Administrative Court for Emilia-Romagna (First Section) on 26 February 2026, No. 334 (case registered under general docket number 58 of 2026), provides an important opportunity to examine the legal framework governing the revocation of the EU long-term residence permit under Article 9 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 25 July 1998 (Italian Immigration Consolidated Act).

The full text of the decision is available at the following link:
https://www.calameo.com/books/008079775aec2d43b9d32

The case originated from a decision of the Police Headquarters of Bologna revoking an EU long-term residence permit on the basis of a finding of social dangerousness, grounded in final criminal convictions for particularly serious offences. The applicant challenged the measure, arguing, inter alia, that the revocation was de facto automatic and that the administration had failed to properly assess his social, family and professional integration in Italy.

The Court addressed the structure of Article 9 of the Immigration Act. Paragraph 4 provides that the EU long-term residence permit cannot be granted to foreigners who are considered a threat to public order or State security. By virtue of the combined effect of paragraphs 4 and 7, the permit may also be revoked where the relevant conditions are no longer met. However, the provision requires a substantive assessment: the authority must consider the duration of lawful residence in Italy and the level of social, family and professional integration of the person concerned.

The judgment aligns with consolidated case law holding that revocation of long-term residence status cannot be based on an automatic link between criminal conviction and loss of status. A current and individualized assessment of dangerousness is required. In the present case, the Court found that the administration had carried out such an assessment, examining the seriousness of the offences, the impact on fundamental rights, and the applicant’s overall conduct. The evaluation was deemed neither illogical nor unreasonable, and therefore the revocation was upheld as lawful in that respect.

The most significant aspect of the ruling concerns Article 9, paragraph 9, of the Immigration Act. This provision states that where a long-term EU residence permit is revoked and expulsion is not ordered, the foreign national must be granted another type of residence permit in accordance with the Immigration Act. The norm embodies a principle of legal continuity: the loss of the “enhanced” long-term status does not automatically entail irregular stay.

In the case at hand, the Police Authority failed to carry out any assessment regarding the possible issuance of an alternative residence permit. The Court therefore partially upheld the appeal, annulling the decision insofar as it omitted consideration of this statutory obligation. The administration is now required to re-examine the applicant’s position and to assess, in light of his current circumstances, whether the requirements for a different residence permit are met.

The judgment is noteworthy for its balanced approach. On the one hand, it reaffirms the administration’s discretionary power to protect public order through a properly reasoned and individualized dangerousness assessment. On the other, it underscores that such discretion must operate within the full framework of statutory guarantees. Revocation cannot create a legal vacuum; if expulsion is not imposed, a new legal status must be evaluated.

The decision thus reinforces a core principle of the rule of law in immigration matters: administrative discretion must always be exercised in compliance with proportionality, procedural completeness, and substantive legality.

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
ORCID: 0009-0004-7030-0428

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New on TikTok: Titre : Étranger détenu et droit au renouvellement du titre de séjour : le décret du 7 avril 2026 Bienvenue dans un nouvel épisode du podcast Droit de l’Immigration. Je suis l’avocat Fabio Loscerbo. Aujourd’hui, nous abordons une question très concrète, mais juridiquement essentielle : le droit pour un étranger détenu de renouveler son titre de séjour. L’affaire concerne le décret numéro 2827 de 2026, rendu le 7 avril 2026 par le juge de l’application des peines de Bologne. Il s’agissait d’examiner une demande de permission de sortie présentée par un ressortissant étranger détenu, afin de se rendre personnellement à la Questura pour renouveler son titre de séjour pour protection subsidiaire. Le point central est simple, mais souvent négligé : la procédure administrative exige la présence physique de l’intéressé. Or, la détention rend cela impossible sans autorisation judiciaire. Le juge intervient donc en utilisant l’instrument de la permission de sortie prévu par le droit pénitentiaire. Mais il le fait selon une approche substantielle, et non purement formelle. En effet, le juge considère que la notion d’« événement » justifiant la permission ne doit pas être interprétée de manière restrictive. Une exigence administrative, comme le renouvellement d’un titre de séjour, peut constituer un événement suffisamment grave, dès lors qu’elle affecte la situation juridique et personnelle du détenu. L’absence de renouvellement entraînerait des conséquences graves et potentiellement irréversibles : perte du séjour régulier, interruption du parcours d’intégration et exposition à d’autres mesures administratives. Pour cette raison, le décret autorise le détenu à se rendre à la Questura, en prévoyant des modalités précises, notamment un accompagnement sous escorte pendant toute la durée de la permission. Cette décision affirme un principe fondamental : le droit de l’immigration ne s’interrompt pas en détention. Les procédures administratives continuent de produire leurs effets et doivent être concrètement accessibles. Dans une perspective plus large, cette décision renforce une approche substantielle des droits des étrangers, fondée non sur la condition formelle, mais sur la possibilité réelle d’exercer ses droits. Merci pour votre écoute. À bientôt pour un nouvel épisode du podcast Droit de l’Immigration.

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