Florence Court Reaffirms Complementary Protection: Integration Still Matters After Italy’s 2023 Reform

 Florence Court Reaffirms Complementary Protection: Integration Still Matters After Italy’s 2023 Reform

A decree issued by the Ordinary Court of Florence on 24 December 2025 sends a clear message to both practitioners and policymakers: despite the restrictive turn introduced by Italy’s 2023 immigration reform, complementary protection remains firmly anchored to constitutional principles and international human rights obligations.

The case concerned a Moroccan national whose application for refugee status and subsidiary protection had been rejected by the Territorial Commission. During the judicial phase, the applicant pursued only complementary protection, grounding his claim on the right to respect for private life developed in Italy. The Florence Court upheld the request, ordering the issuance of a residence permit for special protection.

What makes the decision particularly significant is its legal context. With Decree-Law No. 20 of 2023, later converted into Law No. 50 of 2023, the Italian legislature partially rolled back the broader formulation of Article 19 of the Consolidated Immigration Act that had been introduced in 2020. Critics argued that the reform aimed to narrow the scope of protection linked to private and family life. The Florence Court, however, adopted a different reading.

According to the judges, the 2023 reform did not eliminate the protection of private and family life, nor could it do so without violating constitutional and conventional obligations. Instead, it removed rigid legislative criteria, returning greater responsibility to judicial assessment on a case-by-case basis. In other words, the law changed its form, not its substance.

The court placed strong emphasis on the applicant’s integration in Italy. Over more than two years, he had established stable employment, secured lawful housing, attended training courses, and built a solid network of social relationships. These elements, taken together, constituted a “consolidated private life” under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. His removal, the court reasoned, would have resulted in a serious and disproportionate interference with that right.

Notably, the judges clarified that integration achieved while awaiting a decision on asylum claims cannot be dismissed as irrelevant or opportunistic. Time spent in legal limbo is still time lived, and the social and professional ties formed during that period are legally significant. This point directly echoes recent Italian Supreme Court case law, which the Florence Court expressly relied upon.

From a broader perspective, the ruling highlights an often-overlooked function of complementary protection. Far from being an emergency or residual measure, it operates as a structural safeguard within the migration system. It distinguishes between individuals who have effectively integrated into the host society and those who have not, ensuring that return policies do not result in unjustified violations of fundamental rights.

The Florence decision therefore fits into a wider debate on migration governance. It suggests that integration remains the key legal criterion for lawful stay, even in a more restrictive legislative environment. At the same time, it implicitly supports the idea that return policies are legitimate where integration has not occurred, provided that fundamental rights are respected.

In this sense, the ruling does not weaken state control over migration. Rather, it reinforces a balanced model: integration leads to protection, while lack of integration may justify return. The court’s message is clear and unsentimental—rights must be protected, but they must be grounded in real social facts.

The full text of the decree is available in the official publication on Calameo:
https://www.calameo.com/books/0080797758860c0b59694

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo